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CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.
The Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. §§
551-59, requires a federal agency to disclose certain documents
within its possession.  But FOIA exempts from mandatory
disclosure “records or information compiled for law enforcement
purposes . . . to the extent that the production of such law
3enforcement records or information . . . could reasonably be
expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy,”  § 552 (b)(7)(C) (“Exemption 7(C)”), and defines
“person” to “include an individual, partnership, corporation,
association, or public or private organization other than an agency,”
§ 551(2).  Human beings have such “personal privacy.”  This case
requires us to determine whether corporations do, as well.
AT&T, Inc. (“AT&T”) argued that the Federal
Communications Commission (“FCC”) could not lawfully release
documents obtained during the course of an investigation into an
alleged overcharging on the ground that disclosure would likely
invade the company’s “personal privacy.”  The FCC rejected
AT&T’s argument and held that a corporation, as a matter of law,
has no “personal privacy” in the first place.  AT&T filed a petition
for review.  We will grant the petition and remand to the FCC for
further proceedings.
I.
AT&T participated in a federal program administered by the
FCC, called “E-Rate,” that was designed to increase schools’
access to advanced telecommunications technology.  As part of the
program, AT&T provided equipment and services to elementary
and secondary schools, and then billed the Government for the cost
of the equipment and services.  In August 2004, AT&T discovered
that it might have overcharged the Government for certain work
done for the New London, Connecticut school district.  AT&T
voluntarily reported the matter to the FCC, and the FCC’s
Enforcement Bureau (“Bureau”) conducted an investigation.  The
two sides ultimately resolved the matter via a consent decree.  
During the course of the investigation, the Bureau ordered
AT&T to produce, and the company did indeed produce, a range of
documents related to its work with the New London schools.
Those documents included invoices, internal e-mails providing
pricing and billing information for the work done in New London,
responses to Bureau interrogatories, names of employees involved
in the allegedly improper billing, and AT&T’s own assessment of
whether and to what extent the employees involved in the
4overcharging violated its internal code of conduct.
On April 4, 2005, CompTel, a trade association representing
some of AT&T’s competitors, submitted a FOIA request for “[a]ll
pleadings and correspondence contained in” the Bureau’s AT&T
E-Rate investigation file.  Appendix (“App.”) 27.  AT&T
submitted a letter to the Bureau opposing CompTel’s request,
arguing that the FCC collected the documents that AT&T produced
for law enforcement purposes and therefore that the FCC
regulations implementing FOIA’s exemptions prohibited
disclosure.  CompTel submitted a reply letter.  
On August 5, 2005, the Bureau issued a letter-ruling
rejecting AT&T’s argument that Exemption 7(C) and the FCC’s
regulations implementing that exemption prohibit disclosure.  That
exemption, the Bureau held, does not apply to corporations because
corporations lack “personal privacy.”  AT&T filed an application
requesting the FCC to review the Bureau’s ruling.  On September
12, 2008, the FCC issued an order denying the application and
compelling disclosure, again on the ground that Exemption 7(C)
does not apply to corporations.
Before addressing the merits, the FCC held that AT&T
failed to comply with the FCC’s regulations in filing its application
for review of the Bureau’s order.  Generally, only a FOIA requester
may file an application for the FCC to review the Bureau’s
resolution of that request.  But, there is an exception.  According
to 47 C.F.R. § 0.461(i)(1), when a FOIA request for inspection of
records submitted in confidence pursuant to §§ 0.457(d) or 0.459
is granted (even if only in part), the submitter of the information –
in addition to the requester – may file an application for review.
The FCC determined, however, that AT&T did not submit the
material it provided to the FCC in confidence pursuant to either of
those regulations, because AT&T failed to include with that
material a request that the FCC treat that material as confidential.
Nevertheless, the FCC stated that it would, “on [its] own motion,”
consider the merits of AT&T’s application for review.  App. 10.
The FCC then held that a corporation lacks “personal
privacy” within the meaning of Exemption 7(C).  It determined that
 Disclosure is currently stayed pending the outcome of this1
appeal.
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FCC precedent supports this view, App. 10 (citing Chadmoore
Commc’n, Inc., 13 FCC Rcd. 23943, 23946-47 ¶ 7 (1998)), as does
judicial precedent, App. 11-12 (citing U.S. Dep’t of Justice v.
Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 756
(1989); Wash. Post Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 863 F.2d 96, 100-
01 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Cohen v. EPA, 575 F. Supp. 425, 429-30
(D.D.C. 1983)).  The FCC also concluded that this interpretation
accords with the Exemption’s purpose to protect key players in an
investigation – targets, witnesses, and law enforcement officers –
from the “literal embarrassment and danger” that an individual
might suffer, rather than from the “more abstract impact” that a
corporation might suffer.  App. 12.  The FCC stated that a
corporation’s privacy interests in other contexts – such as Fourth
Amendment search-and-seizure law and the discovery regime
created by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure – have no bearing
on whether a corporation has a privacy interest in the context of
Exemption 7(C).  App. 13.
AT&T filed a petition for review of the FCC’s order,
arguing that the FCC incorrectly interpreted Exemption 7(C) to
prevent a corporation from claiming a “personal privacy” interest.
AT&T further argues that, should we interpret the statute to allow
a corporation to claim a “personal privacy” interest, disclosure of
AT&T’s documents is, as a matter of law, reasonably likely to
constitute an “unwarranted invasion” of that interest.  The FCC and
CompTel (who entered this case as an intervenor) oppose on the
merits and also raise certain threshold issues.  CompTel argues that
this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over AT&T’s petition
for review and therefore must dismiss.  The FCC argues that we
should deny the petition for review because AT&T failed to
challenge the FCC’s determination that AT&T did not comply with
certain procedural requirements during the administrative
proceedings.1
6II.
The FCC had jurisdiction to issue its order denying AT&T’s
application for review.  See 47 U.S.C. §§ 154(i) (providing that the
FCC “may perform any and all acts, make such rules and
regulations, and issue such orders, not inconsistent with [the
Communications Act of 1934 (“Communications Act”), 47 U.S.C.
§§ 151-615b], as may be necessary in the execution of its
functions”), 155(c)(5) (authorizing the FCC to adjudicate
applications for review of order issued by delegated panel).
CompTel argues that we lack appellate jurisdiction.  We disagree.
CompTel asserts that because the Administrative Procedure
Act (“APA”) confers AT&T’s cause of action, and because 28
U.S.C. § 1331 provides jurisdiction to review an APA claim, the
district courts have jurisdiction to hear AT&T’s petition for review.
CompTel acknowledges that 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1) gives the courts
of appeals exclusive jurisdiction over orders “under” the
Communications Act within the meaning of 47 U.S.C. § 402(a),
but argues that the FCC’s order in this matter is not such an order.
CompTel made this argument for the first time to this Court
in opposing AT&T’s petition for review (which is the first time it
could have made this argument).  Therefore, there is no decision on
this issue to review, and we will address the issue in the first
instance.
Section 2342 provides that “[t]he court[s] of appeals . . .
ha[ve] exclusive jurisdiction to enjoin, set aside, suspend (in whole
or in part), or to determine the validity of–(1) all final orders of the
[FCC] made reviewable by section 402(a) of title 47.”  28 U.S.C.
§ 2342(1).  A “final order[] of the [FCC] made reviewable by
section 402(a) of title 47,” § 2342(1), is, with certain exceptions
not relevant here, “an[] order of the [FCC] under th[e
Communications] Act . . . .”  47 U.S.C. § 402(a).  Thus, we have
jurisdiction to review the FCC’s order adjudicating AT&T’s
application for review if that order is an order “under” the
Communications Act.
Courts have consistently held that an order adjudicating an
 FOIA itself does not prohibit disclosure of information2
falling within its exemptions.  When information falls within an
exemption, no party can compel disclosure, but the FCC can still
make a disclosure on its own accord unless some independent
source of law prohibits the agency from doing so.  See Chrysler
Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 293 (1979) (explaining that,
standing alone, FOIA’s exemptions “do[] not give [courts] the
authority to bar disclosure”).  Thus, the disclosure of information
falling within an exemption does not violate FOIA itself, but rather
an independent source of law.  Here, FCC regulations provide this
independent source.  See 47 C.F.R. § 0.457(g)(3) (prohibiting
disclosure of information covered by Exemption 7(C)).
 CompTel cites two cases, Chrysler, 441 U.S. 281, and GTE3
Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumer Product Safety Comm’n, 598 F.2d 790
(3d Cir. 1979), which it claims stand for the proposition that the
district courts, not the courts of appeals, have jurisdiction to review
reverse-FOIA claims.  CompTel is mistaken.  True, in each of
those cases, the district courts, rather than the courts of appeals,
7
alleged violation of FCC regulations is an order “under” the
Communications Act within the meaning of § 402(a).  See, e.g.,
Rocky Mountain Radar, Inc. v. FCC, 158 F.3d 1118, 1119, 1121-
23 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that an order determining that a
business violated FCC regulations governing the marketing of
radar-jamming devices is an order “under” the Communications
Act within the meaning of § 402(a)); Maier v. FCC, 735 F.2d 220,
224 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that order determining that a
broadcasting company did not violate FCC regulations governing
personal attacks on news subjects is an order “under” the
Communications Act within the meaning of § 402(a)).  
The FCC’s order that is the subject of AT&T’s petition for
review adjudicated AT&T’s claim that disclosure of the
information collected by the FCC concerning the E-Rate program
in New London would violate FCC regulations implementing
Exemption 7(C).   Therefore, the order constituted an order2
“under” the Communications Act within the meaning of § 402(a).
As a result, § 2342(1) provides that the courts of appeals have
exclusive jurisdiction to review that order.  3
had jurisdiction to hear a reverse-FOIA claim.  But neither of those
opinions indicate that the laws allegedly barring disclosure in those
cases contain any provision triggering the operation of a statute that
would have vested jurisdiction exclusively in another court.
 If the FCC lacked the authority to consider the merits on4
its own motion, then perhaps its order actually did consist of two
alternative holdings.  If the FCC lacked such authority, then its
8
III.
Next, the FCC argues that we must affirm the order because
AT&T has failed to challenge the FCC’s determination that AT&T
failed to comply with relevant procedural requirements in filing its
application for review of the Bureau’s order.  We disagree.
The FCC made this argument for the first time in opposing
AT&T’s petition for review (which is the first time it could have
made this argument).  Therefore, there is no decision on this issue
to review, and we will address the issue in the first instance.  When
a decision rests on multiple, independent grounds, a reviewing
court should affirm it if one of those grounds is correct.  See Levy
v. Sterling Holding Co., 544 F.3d 493, 508-09 (3d Cir. 2008).  An
appellant waives an argument in support of reversal if he does not
raise that argument in his opening brief.  FDIC v. Deglau, 207 F.3d
153, 169 (3d Cir. 2000).
AT&T’s procedural default was not an independent ground
supporting the FCC’s decision.  The FCC, in its order, specifically
stated that although it recognized AT&T’s default, it would
consider AT&T’s claims on the merits “on [its] own motion.”
App. 10.  This belies the FCC’s claim that procedural default was
an alternative holding.  If it truly was an alternative holding, the
FCC would not have needed to make its “own motion” to excuse
the default in order to reach the merits.  It could have discussed
procedural default and then, separately and without any justifying
segue, discussed the merits.  Had the FCC done this, the procedural
default holding would stand as an independent, sufficient ground
for denial.  That the FCC did not do this tells us that it did not
(even in the alternative) base its decision on procedural default.4
justification for issuing a merits holding – its “own motion” to
excuse procedural default – would have been erroneous, and all
that would have remained would be one procedural default holding
and one merits holding, with nothing connecting the two.  But
CompTel does not appear to argue that the FCC lacked such
authority, and for good reason:  the FCC had it.  See 47 C.F.R. §
1.3 (allowing the FCC to waive any regulation “for good cause
shown”).
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IV.
AT&T argues that the FCC incorrectly interpreted
Exemption 7(C) when it held that a corporation lacks the “personal
privacy” protected by that exemption.  We agree with AT&T.
The FCC’s interpretation of Exemption 7(C) is not entitled
to deference under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), because FOIA applies
government-wide, and no one agency is charged with enforcing it.
ACLU v. Dep’t of Def., 543 F.3d 59, 66 (2d Cir. 2008) (declining
to accord deference to Department of Defense interpretation of
FOIA).  Thus, we exercise plenary review of the FCC’s
interpretation of FOIA, and will set aside the FCC’s decision if it
is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law.”  See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
A.
In 1966, dissatisfied with then-existing statutory
mechanisms compelling disclosure of Government records,
Congress enacted FOIA to improve public access to information
controlled by federal agencies.  See OSHA Data/CIH, Inc. v. U.S.
Dep’t of Labor, 220 F.3d 153, 160 (3d Cir. 2000) (describing
Congress’s intent).  FOIA embodies a philosophy of full
disclosure:  an agency may deny a reasonable request for
information only if the information falls into a statutorily
delineated exemption.  Id.  
This case concerns the so-called law enforcement
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exemption, Exemption 7(C), which shields from mandatory
disclosure “records or information compiled for law enforcement
purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law
enforcement records or information . . . could reasonably be
expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy.”  5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C).  FOIA’s Exemption 6 also uses
the phrase “personal privacy,” shielding from compulsory
disclosure “personnel and medical files and similar files the
disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy.”  § 552(b)(6).  FOIA does not define
“personal,” but it does define “person” to “include[] an individual,
partnership, corporation, association, or public or private
organization other than an agency.”  § 551(2).
Neither the Supreme Court nor this Court has ever squarely
rejected a proffered personal privacy interest of a corporation.  The
most that can be said of the Supreme Court’s cases and of our cases
is that they suggest that Exemptions 7(C) and 6 frequently and
primarily protect – and that Congress may have intended them to
protect – the privacy of individuals.  See, e.g., Reporters Comm.,
489 U.S. at 764 n.16; U.S. Dep’t of State v. Wash. Post Co., 456
U.S. 595, 599 (1982); Davin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 60 F.3d 1043,
1058 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Landano v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 956
F.2d 422, 426 (3d Cir. 1992)); Manna v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 51
F.3d 1158, 1166 (3d Cir. 1995); Cuccaro v. Sec’y of Labor, 770
F.2d 355, 359 (3d Cir. 1985) (citing Lame v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
654 F.2d 917, 923 (3d Cir. 1981)).
B.
As the Supreme Court has held, a court must “begin by
looking at the language of the [statute] . . . . When [the court]
find[s] the terms of a statute unambiguous, judicial inquiry is
complete, except ‘in rare and exceptional circumstances.’”  Rubin
v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1981) (quoting TVA v.
Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 187 n.33 (1978) (quotation marks and citation
omitted)). 
AT&T argues that the plain text of Exemption 7(C)
indicates that it applies to corporations.  After all, “personal” is the
11
adjectival form of “person,” and FOIA defines “person” to include
a corporation.  We agree.  It would be very odd indeed for an
adjectival form of a defined term not to refer back to that defined
term.  See Del. River Stevedores v. DiFidelto, 440 F.3d 615, 623
(3d Cir. 2006) (Fisher, J., concurring) (stating that it is a
“grammatical imperative[]” that “a statute which defines a noun
has thereby defined the adjectival form of that noun”).  Further,
FOIA’s exemptions indicate that Congress knew how to refer
solely to human beings (to the exclusion of corporations and other
legal entities) when it wanted to.  Exemption 7(F), for example,
protects information gathered pursuant to a law enforcement
investigation that, if released, “could reasonably be expected to
endanger the life or physical safety of any individual.”  5 U.S.C. §
552(b)(7)(F) (emphasis added).  Yet, Congress, in Exemption 7(C),
did not refer to “the privacy of any individual” or some variant
thereof; it used the phrase “personal privacy.”
The FCC and CompTel’s text-based arguments to the
contrary are unconvincing.  They cite Supreme Court case law for
the proposition that, whenever possible, statutory words should be
interpreted “in their ordinary, everyday senses.”  Malat v. Riddell,
383 U.S. 569, 571 (1966).  The ordinary meaning of “person” is
human being, so, the argument concludes, “personal” must
incorporate this ordinary meaning.  This argument is unpersuasive.
It fails to take into account that “person” – the root from which the
statutory word at issue is derived – is a defined term.  See
Biskupski v. Att’y Gen., 503 F.3d 274, 280 (3d Cir. 2007) (“If, as
here, ‘a statute includes an explicit definition, we must follow that
definition, even if it varies from that term’s ordinary meaning.’”
(quoting Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 942 (2000))).
The FCC and CompTel next argue that FOIA’s other uses
of the phrase “personal privacy” indicate that the phrase does not
encompass corporations.  They point to Exemption 6, which shields
from mandatory disclosure “personnel and medical files and similar
files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy,” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6), and observe
that courts have held that this exemption applies only to individuals
and not to corporations.  Thus, the FCC and CompTel argue, the
phrase “personal privacy” in Exemption 6 applies only to
 Nevertheless, we note that interpreting “personal privacy”5
according to its plain textual meaning serves Exemption 7(C)’s
purpose of providing broad protection to entities involved in law
enforcement investigations in order to encourage cooperation with
federal regulators.  Corporations, like human beings, are routinely
involved in law enforcement investigations.  Corporations, like
human beings, face public embarrassment, harassment, and stigma
because of that involvement.  Reading “personal privacy” to
exclude corporations would disserve Exemption 7(C)’s purpose of
encouraging corporations – like human beings – to cooperate and
be forthcoming in such investigations.  Finally on this topic, “[t]he
best evidence of th[e] purpose [of a statutory text] is the statutory
text adopted by both Houses of Congress and submitted to the
President.”  W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98
(1991), superseded by statute on other grounds, Civil Rights Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).  That text, we
have explained, demonstrates that a corporation may have
“personal privacy” within the meaning of Exemption 7(C).
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individuals, and therefore “personal privacy” in Exemption 7(C)
applies only to individuals, as well.  This argument is flawed.
Suppose (though we express no opinion on the issue) that
Exemption 6 applies only to individuals (and not to corporations).
This does not mean that each and every component phrase in that
exemption, taken on its own, limits Exemption 6 to individuals.  It
means only that some language in that exemption does so.  The
phrase “personnel and medical files” serves this function.  It limits
Exemption 6 to individuals because only individuals (and not
corporations) may be the subjects of such files.  Therefore, nothing
necessarily can be gleaned about the scope of “personal privacy,”
because Exemption 6 would apply only to individuals even if
“personal privacy,” taken on its own, encompasses corporations.
Thus, we hold that FOIA’s text unambiguously indicates
that a corporation may have a “personal privacy” interest within the
meaning of Exemption 7(C).  This, for us, ends the matter.  Rubin,
449 U.S. at 429-30.  We need not consider the parties’ arguments
concerning statutory purpose,  relevant (but non-binding) case5
 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit6
cases discussed by the parties – Multi Ag Media LLC v.
Department of Agriculture, 515 F.3d 1224 (D.C. Cir. 2008),
Judicial Watch, Inc. v. FDA, 449 F.3d 141 (D.C. Cir. 2006), and
Washington Post, 863 F.2d 96 – do not impugn our textual
analysis.  The court in Multi Ag Media suggested that “personal
privacy” within the meaning of Exemption 6 extends to individuals
only.  But it appears to have inferred this conclusion from its
observation that Congress’s main purpose in enacting Exemption
6 was to protect individuals (and not necessarily corporations).  See
515 F.3d at 1228.  We do not believe that inferring the statute’s
meaning merely from evidence of the enacting Congress’s chief
purpose is analytically appropriate:  “‘the fact that a statute can be
applied in situations not expressly anticipated by Congress does not
demonstrate ambiguity.  It demonstrates breadth.’”  PGA Tour, Inc.
v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 689 (2001) (quoting Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v.
Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212 (1988) (quotation marks omitted)).  The
Judicial Watch court, in applying Exemption 6, considered only
individuals’ privacy interests in balancing “personal privacy”
against the need for public disclosure.  Yet the court’s description
of the parties’ arguments indicates that the FDA (the federal
agency holding the documents in that case), in its attempt to resist
disclosure, only cited individual privacy interests in the first place.
See 449 F.3d at 152-53.  Thus, the court never had the occasion to
pass on whether “personal privacy” encompasses corporate
privacy.  Finally, the court in Washington Post noted that
Exemption 7(C) concerns only “intimate” details, including
“marital status, legitimacy of children, identity of fathers of
children, medical condition, welfare payments, alcoholic
consumption, family fights, and reputation.”  863 F.2d at 100.  But
a corporation, too, has a strong interest in protecting its reputation.
In any event, to the extent that these cases can be read to
conflict with our textual analysis, we decline to follow them.    
 We decline the FCC and CompTel’s invitation to examine7
the legislative history of Exemption 7(C) because we find the text
of FOIA to be unambiguous.  See In re Mehta, 310 F.3d 308, 311
13
law,  and legislative history.6 7
(3d Cir. 2002) (“We look to the text of a statute to determine
congressional intent, and look to legislative history only if the text
is ambiguous.”); see generally Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, Inc., 561 F.3d
233, 244 (3d Cir. 2009) (“We have recognized that legislative
history is not without its shortcomings as a tool of interpretation.
‘As a point of fact, there can be multiple legislative intents because
hundreds of men and women must vote in favor of a bill in order
for it to become a law.’”) (quoting Morgan v. Gay, 466 F.3d 276,
278 (3d Cir. 2006)).
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V.
AT&T next argues that, as a matter of law, the invasion of
personal privacy caused by the release of the documents the
company submitted to the FCC could reasonably be expected to be
“unwarranted” within the meaning of Exemption 7(C).  We
disagree.
AT&T made this argument to the FCC during the
administrative proceedings, but because the FCC held that
“personal privacy” does not apply to corporations, the FCC did not
have occasion to discuss whether a potential invasion of AT&T’s
“personal privacy” would be “unwarranted.”  Therefore, there is no
decision on this issue to review.
“[U]nder settled principles of administrative law, when a
court reviewing agency action determines that an agency made an
error of law, the court’s inquiry is at an end:  the case must be
remanded to the agency for further action consistent with the
corrected legal standards.”  N.C. Fisheries Ass’n, Inc. v. Gutierrez,
550 F.3d 16, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting PPG Indus. v. United
States, 52 F.3d 363, 365 (D.C. Cir. 1995)).  AT&T attempts to
avoid this bedrock principle by noting that “when [a FOIA] request
seeks no ‘official information’ about a Government agency, but
merely records that the Government happens to be storing,”
granting that request would, as a matter of law, constitute a “clearly
unwarranted” invasion of personal privacy within the meaning of
Exemption 7(C), Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 780, so remand
would be unnecessary.  AT&T argues that none of the AT&T
 Further, determining that each document AT&T submitted8
to the FCC contains some protected content would be difficult
enough, but FOIA requires more.  We would have to be convinced
that every “reasonably segregable portion” of each document
contains protected information.  5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (flush language)
(emphasis added).  Holding, on the very limited record before us,
that Exemption 7(C) protects every reasonably segregable jot and
tittle of each document that AT&T submitted would be truly
extraordinary, and, in our view, not an appropriate course of action
for a reviewing court to undertake in the first instance.
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records that CompTel wants disclosed contains “official
information” about the FCC or otherwise pertain to the FCC’s
conduct.  Rather, AT&T contends that the request is aimed at
gathering information about AT&T, contained in AT&T
documents, that “the Government happens to be storing,” id., by
virtue of the Bureau’s investigation.  We cannot agree.  CompTel’s
FOIA request does not fit into that narrow category.
CompTel has indeed alleged that it seeks “‘official
information’ about a Government agency.”  Id.  For example, in its
opposition to AT&T’s letter-request to block disclosure, CompTel
explains that it seeks information about “the receipt of universal
service support [the E-Rate program] for the New London
Connecticut Public Schools.”  App. 37.  CompTel notes that the
FCC “terminated the investigation upon issuing an Order adopting
a Consent Decree.”  App. 37.  E-Rate has (at least) two
participants:  AT&T, which provides services to the local school
districts (and bills the Government), and the FCC, which actually
administers the entire operation.  It stands to reason, then, that
documents in the FCC’s investigative file may shed light on the
FCC’s administration of E-Rate.  This is especially true given that
CompTel made (as it was entitled to make) a very broad request for
“all” the documents in the investigative file, not merely for those
limited to, say, employee home addresses, which would be less
likely to provide any insight into the functioning of a federal
agency.   8
We therefore abide by long-established principles of
16
administrative law and will remand the matter to the FCC with
instructions to determine, in accordance with our construction of
Exemption 7(C), whether disclosure “could reasonably be expected
to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,” §
552(b)(7)(c).
VI.
For the above reasons, we will grant AT&T’s petition for
review and remand the matter to the FCC for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
